"What's Expected of Us"

Written for a Epistemology and Metaphysics course, the below essay analyzes a fiction short story that deals with the existence (or lack of) free will. We further inquired about this topic by answering the following: The story by Chiang gave us the idea of a predictor, which predicted our pressing it with 100% accuracy. This led to a firm belief that free will didn’t exist. Imagine that God is a predictor like Chiang’s. Could free will exist? Why or why not? What would it be like?

One of the longest debates in history revolves around whether humans have free will, or the ability to make choices free from some sort of outside intervention, namely determinism. If we have complete free will, and most of us behave as if we do, then we can impact our own futures, and there is no such thing as fate or determinism. If we do not have free will, then this may leave people wondering how any of their personal decisions can have any real effect on future outcomes, as it may be predetermined and therefore out of our control. In Ted Chiang’s short story “What’s Expected of Us” (which I briefly explain in the next paragraph) Chiang explores how we do not have total free will. Building off this, I will explore whether the possibility of a God with foreknowledge prohibits true free will: I believe it does not, and that they are compatible.

Although Ted Chiang is more of a science-fiction writer than a philosopher, his short story “What’s Expected of Us” reveals exactly how it feels to grapple with the idea that free will may be an illusion. In the dystopian tale, there exists a device called a “predictor” that has a button as well as a light. The device predicts with 100% accuracy whether the holder will press the button, as signaled by the light, which appears one second before the user presses the button. While this starts as a playful game between the device and its handler, it quickly turns into something so captivating that the users cannot do anything but dedicate their time to try and trick the device. They neglect to take care of themselves as they are so entranced by the predictor. Yet, the device is still correct each and every time. This is what it feels like to the philosopher who is trying to determine if their existence is determined. Chiang seems to allude to the fact that there is some sort of predictor in actuality, something or someone who has determined whether we will press the button, almost compelling us to act accordingly.

As stated previously, this paper builds off Chiang’s idea that free will cannot exist if there is a “predictor”, per se, who predetermines how we will respond and behave in any situation. For clarity’s sake, I will rely on the traditional Christian view of God to establish whether He is like the predictor, prohibiting free will. The predictor in Chiang’s story seems to have a level of omniscience—it determines, without fail, whether a person will push the button, and signals beforehand to prove this foreknowledge. The other predictor, God, is said to be omniscient, or all knowing, meaning He has foreknowledge as well, as the Bible establishes that God can “see” the future. When the light flashes on the predictor, it is because a signal was sent from the future to alert the user that they are about to press the button, and even if the user tries to trick the device, they will end up pressing the button without fail, even after seeing the light. In this case, the user becomes a victim to determinism, in which they can actually see that they are about to do something fixed in time, out of their control, while simultaneously being the one responsible for touching the button, which feels like it is their brain and body controlling it. With God, however, we don’t see this light—we are told our future is determined in the sense that God has a plan for each of us, but we have no real access to that plan or knowledge.

In Proverbs 16:9 (NIV), it states that “in their hearts humans plan their course, but the LORD establishes their steps.” If we take this verse and combine it with the scriptures on God’s omniscience, we see a greater level of free will that allows us to live our lives as we please. After all, that is a major tenant of Christianity: God could not be omnibenevolent (all good) & omnipotent (all powerful) and create moral good without moral evil, so free will can account for all moral evil. Any account saying otherwise would be considered heresy. Therefore, we have the freedom to live our lives as we please, yet God’s will for us will remain sovereign. Followers don’t see a green light that signals that they are about to do something, and therefore don’t need to come to terms with the idea that their actions are fixed and determined—they behave on their own will, at least based on appearances, automatically submitting to Chiang’s suggestion that we “behave as if [our] decisions matter, even though [we] know they don’t.” This proves that determinism and free will are compatible, which is not true of the predictor, at least as Chiang describes it.

One obvious objection one might make is to say that if God were like the predictor, as Chiang describes the predictor, then God would have to signal the foreknowledge the same way the predictor does with the green light. If this is the case, then taking the standard Christian view of God is somewhat pointless for the sake of the argument—He does not have to be as the Bible describes Him, He just has to be similar to the nature of the predictor. If this were the case then any traditional accounts about God or any Biblical scripture cannot be used, because God would have to be fundamentally different than this standard view that these texts provide. Therefore, trying to prove that God assures free will by relying on this definition does not accurately respond to the question at hand: a more accurate representation implies that we must assume that God is a predictor like Chiang’s. Chiang’s predictor is able to take future information to determine what will occur in the present, and humans must actively grapple with this, as they can see their fate unfolding before them. If we reexamined it under this light, then this God would not allow for free will, as we would be constantly reminded that true free will does not exist, and that every action is determined. Therefore, free will and determinism would be incompatible, and because determinism must exist for this argument, free will cannot exist alongside it.

For the purposes of this argument, I rely on the traditional view of the Christian God, which the above objection takes issue with. If the question asks us to consider that God is like the predictor, then would our very definitions of God have to change in order for me to accurately respond? I believe not. The reason many people even approach this topic is because they are taught that they have some level of free will, then interact with religious texts that, on the surface level, contradicts this free will. That is what makes this argument interesting, because we either must find a way to prove that foreknowledge and free will are compatible, or we have to decide we don’t have free will. Because much of western though is dependent on our having free will, the religious notions of determinism are the very reason this whole argument is worth having, and why it still exists after centuries of debate. Therefore, changing the definition of God to better answer the question would not deliver a more fruitful response. In fact, it would be so niche that there would be no way to verify any of the claims made about the God who exists like the predictor, making the argument weaker if I approached the question in such a way. Additionally, the vagueness of the word “like” (in the statement “imagine that God is a predictor like Chiang’s”) does not imply the need for an overhaul of the standard attributes of God, just as it doesn’t imply the need for us to change Chiang’s properties of the predictor. If we generally decided to adopt new definitions to best answer the question, then the questions would never fully get answered. Therefore, I stand by my decision to rely on Biblical texts and doctrinal teachings of the Christian God to benefit the debate.

This paper took the framework that Chiang provided in his sci-fi short “What’s Expected of us” for the predictor and applied it to standard religious ideology to determine whether free will and determinism could be compatible in religious belief. While Chiang decides that the predictor prohibits humans from having free will, Christian belief does not prohibit such, and instead finds compatibility between the two. I then argue on how I am empowered to make such a claim, even if the argument uses some liberty to best interpret the given prompt in a way that benefits philosophical debate.